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Measuring the Impact of Electricity Market Reform in a Chinese Context 
 
Michael G. Pollitt1 
Judge Business School 
University of Cambridge 
 
Abstract 
This paper draws on international experience to examine how the ongoing power sector 
reform (PSR) in China since 2015 should be measured and assessed. We proceed by 
reviewing some relevant international reform experience and then applying this to the 
Chinese context. Thus we focus on some of the extensive previous literature which has 
documented reforms in cross-country and in single country studies. We pay particular 
attention to the European Union (EU) single electricity market, which is the largest 
integrated electricity market in the world. We also look at a social cost benefit analyses of 
UK electricity market reforms and how these might applied in a given Chinese province. We 
go on to examine the actual price impact evidence from two leading provinces – Guangdong 
and Zhejiang – on the overall price effect and on exactly how those price effects have been 
achieved. We then offer some insights from the extensive regulatory reporting by leading 
regulators on market performance that is relevant to PSR in China based on excellent annual 
reporting from the UK, Australia and the US. 
 
Keywords: power sector reform, social cost benefit analysis, state of the market 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 
This paper seeks to discuss how the impact of electricity market reform should be measured 
in the context of the 2015 Power Sector Reform (PSR) in China which is the subject of this 
special issue. 
 
A central idea in this paper is that the measurement of the impact of power market reform 
is not straightforward and therefore needs to focus on variables that are relevant and 
important for public policy. Better monitoring and data reporting by regulators can focus 
attention on the key variables and highlight problems that need to be addressed both ahead 
of and in real time. 
 
We draw on extensive experience from around the world that would seem to be relevant to 
China. We proceed by first reviewing some relevant international reform experience and 
then applying this to the Chinese context. Our examples are necessarily selective but 
intended to be informative for a Chinese (and other reforming jurisdictions) audience. 
 
 
1 The author wishes to thank the British Embassy in Beijing and the UK Prosperity Fund for their ongoing 
support for his work on China’s electricity reforms. General lessons on Chinese power market reform from 
international experience are contained in Pollitt (2020) and Pollitt, Yang and Chen (2017, 2018) and Pollitt and 
Dale (2018). Financial support from the ‘Efficiency Analysis and Policy Recommendation of Jiangsu Power 
Market Design and Operation’ project (FPP207) from the UK Prosperity Fund is acknowledged, as are 
comments from colleagues on this project. Jun Xu also provided excellent comments on the paper. I am very 
grateful for the comments of two anonymous referees. All errors are his own. 
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We focus on some of the extensive previous literature which has documented reforms in 
cross-country and in single country studies. We pay particular attention to the European 
Union (EU) single electricity market, which is the largest integrated electricity market in the 
world, and covers (until the end of 2020) 518 million people2. This market provides a model 
for a Chinese electricity market built out of provincial and regional (multi-provincial) 
markets. We also look at social cost benefit analyses of UK electricity market reforms. These 
reforms started early (from 1990) and provide well documented experiences of both how to 
measure reform impacts and how big the impacts might be. Chinese power market reform 
has been running for more than 6 years (since at least March 2015, with some trialing 
before then) and it has had a substantial impact on the price of industrial electricity (which 
we show below). We look at the evidence from two leading provinces – Guangdong and 
Zhejiang - on the price effect and on exactly how those price effects have been achieved. 
We go on to offer some insights from the extensive regulatory reporting by leading 
regulators on market performance that is relevant to the 2015 PSR in China. We show that 
UK, Australian and US federal regulators and individual US market monitoring of reformed 
electricity markets provide excellent examples of annual reporting on market performance 
that are worthy of study.  
 
We will begin section 2 by laying out some principles for measuring market reform impact 
and review some of the previous literature. Section 3 will discuss measurement of the 
reform in the EU single electricity market. Section 4 draws on the specific experience of the 
UK. Section 5 will look at initial measurement of the price impact of electricity reforms in 
Guangdong and Zhejiang. Section 6 will discuss the annual monitoring of reform and some 
examples of measurements that shed light on how well reform is going. Section 7 concludes. 
 
Section 2: Some principles for measuring market reform impact 
 
Pollitt (2012), in a review of the impact of global energy market liberalisation, discusses 
various studies which measure the impact of energy liberalisation. He identifies four 
(reasonably) robust types of studies in the literature. Performance metric regressions 
examine the impact of privatisation/liberalisation variables on panel data of performance 
(e.g. Steiner, 2001).  Statistical tests of before and after performance conduct a t-test for 
significant differences in performance metrics before and after privatisation (following 
D’Souza and Megginson, 1999).  Social cost benefit analyses of reform (following Jones et 
al., 1990) look at reform as an investment which has costs and benefits.  Macro studies of 
reform attempt to find impacts using general equilibrium models of the economy. These 
studies track the impact of lower prices and costs in significant reformed industries on GDP 
(e.g. Chisari et al., 1999). Jamasb et al. (2017), in their recent review of studies of electricity 
reforms in developing countries, conclude that social cost benefit analyses of reform are 
less common than they might be given the importance of the topic, and that more of these 
sorts of studies are required. 
 
Measuring electricity reform presents a particular challenge for these types of studies. This 
is because compared with, say, measuring the impact of the domestic privatisation of oil 
and upstream gas, electricity ‘reform’ is a package of measures which makes it difficult to 
 
2 Population of EU-27 + UK + Norway. 
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get a clean measure of the impact of reform per se. Thus electricity reforms often involve 
multiple changes – such as privatisation, structural reform, the introduction of wholesale 
markets and changes to the nature of regulation – in markets which are largely domestic 
and specific to the jurisdiction at hand. This simultaneity of reforms makes assessing the 
‘reform’ impact difficult. It might be for instance that the introduction of a wholesale 
market was not a significant element in improving electricity system performance, but if it 
happened at the same time as other elements of reform which did have a positive impact 
(such as incentive regulation of networks), it might be hard to identify that this was the 
case. Data on a number of jurisdictions might aid the econometric identification of the 
contributions of various reform elements (f.Steiner, 2001). 
 
The evidence on electricity reform from performance metric regressions seems to be that 
for European Union (EU) countries there is evidence of modest productivity improvements 
(e.g. Steiner (2001), Hattori and Tsutsui  (2004), Fiorio et al. (2007)). However the impact on 
prices of the different reform elements is ambiguous: prices do not significantly change. 
Pollitt (2009), after examining the econometric studies from developing countries concludes 
that, in general: privatisation improves efficiency with independent regulation; 
privatisation/regulation have no significant effect on prices; private investment is stimulated 
by independent regulation. 
 
Jamasb et al. (2004) highlight the positive experiences of the UK, Chile, Argentina, Peru, 
Philippines, Brazil and Colombia with electricity reform, based on individual country studies. 
Some of the studies they review make use of formal social cost benefit analysis, which we 
outline in the next section. 
 
Table 1 summarises social cost benefit analysis of electricity reform studies. These particular 
studies focus on the privatisation event, but often - as in the case of the UK which we 
discuss in the next section – involved other reform elements happening at the same time. 
These studies show both the size of the gain in relation to the existing size of the companies 
involved and who, within society (consumers, producers or the government), got them. As 
can be seen in Table 1, the gains are positive but modest (around 5% lower revenue/costs) 
and in general they are not fully received by consumers but instead go substantially to 
investors (who are often foreign for smaller developing countries) and to the government. 
 
Table 1: Results for Social Cost Benefit Analyses of Electricity Reforms 
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Source: Pollitt (2012, p.133). 
 
The US has not experienced privatisation but has had a set of power sector reforms, often 
involving restructuring of existing monopoly companies to create competitive wholesale 
electricity markets. The US studies we report, all use performance metric regressions. 
 
Fabrizio et al. (2007) use time series econometrics of US power plants to show that reform is 
associated with up to a 5% reduction in plant level non-fuel generation costs. Joskow (2006) 
used time series econometrics to find that competitive wholesale and retail markets 
reduced prices (relative to their absence) by 5-10% for residential customers and 5% for 
industrial customers.  Barmack et al. (2007) look at the wholesale power market in New 
England and find a net gain of 2% of costs.  Kwoka and Pollitt (2010) show that unbundling 
appears to raise electricity distribution costs, relative to not unbundling.  Triebs et al. (2010) 
show losses on distribution unbundling are more than offset by gains on generation costs. 
Again the evidence is that the massive reorganisation of the US electricity sector has 
resulted in only modest overall gains. 
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There have been some studies of China’s recent power market reforms. Chen et al. (2020) 
suggest that a move to market based economic dispatch could reduce power could reduce 
coal consumption in the Chinese power sector by 5.8%. Lin et al. (2019) find that wholesale 
electricity prices in Guangdong could fall by 9-27% as a result of market based pricing, while 
Abhyankar et al. (2020) found that even larger wholesale price reductions of up to 35% if 
the entire China Southern Grid area, including Guangdong, were integrated in a market 
based system.  
 
The key thing to say about these studies is that these are not based on actual pre- and post- 
reform data. They are simulations of the potential for improved performance based on the 
existing system costs, by simply moving towards more efficient allocation of existing 
generation capacity. These studies do not therefore fit into any of the categories which we 
have discussed above. However they do indicate a large potential for reform impact, which 
is larger than an equivalent study for the US or the EU would have concluded prior to their 
wholesale market reforms3, partly because these systems already used least-cost power 
plant dispatch algorithms even within large monopoly electricity utilities. 
 
One study that does look at actual data on Chinese power market reform is Zheng et al. 
(2021).4 They look at on-grid generation prices and average retail electricity prices for 2003-
2018 for a number of Chinese provinces to conduct a performance metric regression 
analysis. They introduce a reform dummy in 2015 to find a statistically significant impact. 
This amounted to a 2-5% reduction in average retail electricity prices due to PSR and a fall of 
thermal on-grid generation prices of 12%. They also find that coal use per unit of output has 
fallen and that quality of service (measured by reliability and supply interruptions) has 
worsened following reform. This analysis only looks at the first 3 years of reform and is not 
based on a well-developed counterfactual of reform (as discussed below). Clearly further 
investigation of this result, especially in the light of the results of the simulation studies and 
the evidence presented in section 5 of much larger absolute price reductions in specific 
electricity prices since 2015, is warranted.  
 
Lessons for China 
The international evidence on the impact of power market reform, even where it involves 
structural reform, ownership change and the introduction of power markets happening all 
at once should be expected to have modest impacts if a proper control/counterfactual is 
undertaken.  
 
This is for two reasons. First, the assets involved in the electricity sector change only slowly 
and hence much of the gain comes from saving short term operating costs (i.e. labour). This 
can only be achieved with significant reorganisation (including redundancy) costs. Second, 
reduced prices, per se, are not a pure net gain from reform. Lower prices may simply reflect 
a redistribution from shareholders and the government (who get lower VAT and profits tax) 
to consumers. In China the government is the primary shareholder in the electricity 
 
3 See, for example, Copenhagen Economics (2005) discussed below. 
4 Other studies do discuss Chinese power market reform and its impacts, but their analytical basis is limited. 
For instance, Liu et al. (2019) discuss electricity reforms in Yunnan province reporting falls in the price and 
reductions in the cost of the local grid company. 
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industry, so price reductions for customers may come at the expense of reduced 
government revenue, rather than solely reflect production efficiency improvements. 
 
The literature does highlight a number of elements which increase the benefits of electricity 
reform relevant to China. These are: incentive based network regulation which reduces 
costs; regulation which promotes quality of service and network extension as part of the 
reform process; the deferral of expensive investments; and wholesale markets which 
improve the efficiency of generators competing to be dispatched. It also highlights elements 
of reform which raise costs. These are: expensive unbundling which raises separation costs 
and the costs of creating markets and new market players. Thus to the extent that PSR 
creates expensive new structures such as power markets and suppliers which are then 
financed by electricity consumers, these are costs which need to be set against benefits. All 
of these elements are illustrated in our discussion of the evidence from the UK in section 4. 
 
Section 3: Measuring reform impact in the EU Single electricity market 
 
The EU single electricity market covers the 27 countries of the EU, plus Norway and, until 
the end of 2020, the UK. Following the day-ahead market coupling of power exchanges 
across Europe around 86% of electrical energy in the EU is part of what can be a single price 
zone in the absence of transmission constraints (see Pollitt, 2019). The single market is 
being extended to intra-day trading (around 50% flows across country borders in the correct 
direction from low to high price areas) and balancing energy (around 19% flows across 
country borders in the correct direction) (see Pollitt, 2019). 
 
The single market has been years in the making and has been created and promoted in four 
major sets of EU legislation (in 1996, 2003, 2009 and 2019 – so called ‘energy packages’, 
consisting of new ‘Directives’). These reforms have included: unbundling of competitive and 
monopoly elements of the industry; open access to power networks; competition in 
wholesale and retail electricity markets; and the opening up of cross-border trade in 
electricity. This legislation has been masterminded by the European Commission (see Pollitt, 
2019), who have sought to ‘complete the single market in energy’. The Commission’s own 
analysis of the impact of this major set of reforms – to 2020 - consists of (only) two reports: 
a 2005 report from Copenhagen Economics based on general equilibrium (GE) modelling 
using 1990-03 data; and a 2013 report from Booz et al. based on back of the envelope 
estimates of reform impacts. 
 
The 2005 report (Copenhagen Economics, 2005) estimates market opening at the national 
level, estimating the impact of this on electricity sector performance, and then its wider 
impact in a GE model of whole economy. It estimates a long-run impact on electricity 
productivity of 7-8% and possibly higher price reductions. 
 
The 2013 report (Booz et al., 2013), roughly, estimates savings from electricity trading at 50 
Euros per MWh, attributes a quarter of this to market coupling and suggests current 
benefits are around 2/3 of this, or 2.5bn Euros per year, with 1.5bn still to be realised. The 
report emphasises the further gains from completing the day-ahead market coupling and 
extending it to intra-day, balancing, reserve capacity and financial transmission rights. 
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The rather poor job done by the European Commission in looking at the impact of its own 
reform suggests a number of elements that can be measured when looking at such a large 
and wide ranging reform over a number of national jurisdictions. We suggest 7 areas where 
progress with the EU’s reform can be measured and what the measures might suggest. 
 
1. Pro-competitive structural change 
 
It is important to measure the extent to which structural change has occurred within 
national markets. The OECD product market regulation (PMR) indicators measure structural 
change in a number of regulated industries.5 The overall PMR indicator for electricity shows 
improvement in electricity. Between 2008 and 2013, the PMR fell from 2.4 to 2.1 (out of 6, 
best = 0) for EU against 2.6 to 2.4 for OECD as a whole. This overall indicator was driven by a 
significant increase in competition in generation and retail markets. The PMR weights 
questions on entry regulation, public ownership, vertical integration, retail price regulation 
and other questions.6 
 
2. Quality of sector regulation 
 
Green et al. (2009) discuss how to measure the form and process of electricity sector 
regulation across the EU. They show that this has improved. For instance, on form, 
regulatory institutions with significant powers have been created and these often operate 
independently of central government. On process, regulators may be conducting 
sophisticated benchmarking exercises to compare the performance of regulated companies. 
However, as they discuss, it is difficult to measure if the outcomes of regulation have 
improved without a detailed analysis of a particular regulatory ruling. 
 
3. Prices, costs, rate of return on capital and fuel poverty 
 
It is important to measure the price, cost and rate of return impacts of reform. We want 
reform to reduce prices and costs while maintaining a fair rate of return for companies in 
the sector. We also have a particular concern for poorer consumers, as even if prices have 
to rise in some circumstances to cover costs and a fair rate of return, we don't want the 
poorest consumers to be too adversely affected. Roughly we are talking about the impact of 
reform on consumer and producer surplus and how it is distributed between consumers and 
the companies involved. 
 
There is limited evidence of reduced household electricity prices in EU (da Silva et al., 2017), 
but better evidence on wholesale price convergence between countries (e.g. Menezes and 
Houllier, 2016). Mergers between utility companies across Europe has created merger gains 
at the same time as falling returns, especially following the 2003 directive (e.g. Tulloch et al., 
2018). There is little evidence of increased fuel poverty (roughly, the percentage of 
households spending more than 10% of income on energy), though this remains a serious 
problem in some countries where energy bills can be high. 
 
5 See https://www.oecd.org/economy/reform/indicators-of-product-market-regulation/ 





4. Quality of service 
 
There has been a general reduction in customer minutes lost for final customers across EU 
in the years following reform (see CEER, 2016). There is also some evidence of improved 
transmission system reliability (looking at average transmission interruption time). There 
were some early issues with increased wide area trading leading to cross-border blackouts 
(e.g. in 2003 and 2006), largely as a result of a lack of real-time communication between 
transmission system operators (TSOs). However, there have now been significant efforts to 
improve inter TSO coordination with creation of regional security coordinators (e.g. CORESO 
which covers 7 countries and 279m people). 
 
5. Environmental impact 
 
The single market in electricity has seen a big increase in renewable electricity due to heavy 
investment. This has led to a big reduction in CO2 per MWh (-36%, 1990-2014) and larger 
reductions in SO2, NOX and dust emissions from power plants. There is even evidence that 
more extensive national electricity reform is correlated with reduced environmental impacts 
from the electricity sector and higher renewables penetration (e.g. Vona and Nicolli, 2014). 
This is consistent with the view that in the EU markets have favoured gas generation over 
coal generation and that the efficiency gains from liberalisation have been partly spent on 
increased renewables support. 
 
6. Impact on innovation 
 
1999-2021 is a long time over which to assess impact. Small short run static effects of the 
single market may be outweighed by long run dynamic effects. One channel for this might 
be via reduced research and development (R+D) expenditure. R+D in electricity by utilities 
declined sharply following reform, as did patenting by electricity companies. There is weak 
evidence of inverted U relationship in reform impact on patenting across OECD (Marino et 
al., 2017). However the impact of declines in electricity utility R+D on total economy energy 
R+D (and patenting) is unclear. So it is difficult to say what the long-run innovative impact of 
reform has been in the case of the EU. 
 
7. Overall assessments of impact 
 
The evidence for the overall impact of the EU single market reform is surprisingly thin. As 
we have seen the EU itself makes use of simulations of reform impacts (e.g. what would be 
the market power reduction impact on prices). Performance regressions on panel data (e.g. 
Polemis and Stengos, 2017) tend to have questionable approaches to distinguishing 
different reform element effects, especially in the presence of cost increasing renewables 
roll out which has been happening alongside pro-competitive market reforms and incentive 
regulation of networks. Thus the panel data econometrics shows evidence of limited 
productivity improvement but ambiguous price effects, though the overall modest gains 
have been disputed recently. Public dissatisfaction continues with reform, as does regulated 
final household pricing for around half of EU countries. 
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Lessons for China 
Our review of the measurement of EU single market reform suggests a number of reform 
measurements which can be made in a Chinese context. Mainland China consists of 23 
provinces, 5 autonomous region and 4 municipalities directly under central government, 
many of which are comparable to or larger than – in electrical terms – large single electricity 
market countries (Germany, France, Spain, Italy and the UK). The process of market 
electricity market integration across Europe has been impressive, especially considering the 
initial lack of both political and electrical integration. China has the potential for at least as 
extensive electricity market integration than Europe, as it is a single centralised state. 
 
It is important to measure the extent of structural change across Chinese provinces in order 
to benchmark how competitive the market structure of each provincial market is. The OECD 
PMR indicator for electricity would be a good place to start with this. The OECD PMR 
indicators includes figures for China in 2008 and 2013, showing that China’s PMR indicator 
for electricity dropped from 5.815 to 4.5 between 2008 and 2013. It would be interesting to 
do this for a number of Chinese provinces through the reform period since 2013. 
 
China can benefit from benchmarking the quality of its regulatory institutions with respect 
of form, process and outcomes. These include the National Energy Administration(NEA), 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and their provincial offices. They 
remain important in promoting successful reform. We discuss the scope for improved 
regulatory monitoring of reforms in section 6. 
 
As we highlight below, it is very difficult to get consistent information on prices, costs, rates 
of return and percentages of consumers likely to have difficulties in paying their electricity 
bills in China. This is something which should be monitored at the provincial level. 
 
Quality of service at both the distribution and transmission level should be consistently 
monitored and incentivised at the provincial level. A major achievement of European 
reforms has been the application of incentive regulation to measures of quality. The Council 
of European Energy Regulators (CEER) and ACER (the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators) have both improved the monitoring and reporting of quality of service across 
Europe.  
 
The environmental impact of reform is increasingly important. In China, how power market 
reform promotes efficient dispatch of plants and interacts with the pricing of carbon and 
other externalities will become more, not less, significant over time. 
 
A lot of R+D is undertaken within existing electric utilities. This is clearly not sustainable as 
part of a competitive industry subject to incentive regulation of networks. Mechanisms 
need to be found to continue to promote electricity R+D which involve moving existing in-
house research out of existing electricity companies. In some countries this has been done 
successfully by holding innovation competitions whereby network companies can compete 
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for regulatory concessions to increase charges to fund R+D projects (up to a maximum 
percentage of extra revenue).7 
 
A careful analysis of individual provinces overall reform impacts should be undertaken. An 
appropriate method for doing this is a social cost benefit analysis. We now discuss how this 
can be done, drawing on example analyses from the UK. 
 
Section 4: Measuring reform impact in the UK 
 
In this section we describe the social cost benefit analysis (SCBA) methodology applied to 
measuring reform impact. SCBA is great way of measuring reform impact for a single 
jurisdiction when the reform has been in progress for a number of years. It has been 
successfully applied by the World Bank for a number of industries that were liberalised and 
privatised (following the methodology in Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang, 1990). It has been 
systematically applied to UK electricity reforms in a series of papers (Newbery and Pollitt, 
1997; Pollitt, 1997; Pollitt, 1999; and Domah and Pollitt, 2001). 
 
The analysis aims to assess whether the overall welfare impact measured in terms of social 
surplus has a positive net present value (NPV). The total welfare can include quality and 
environmental impacts. The NPV can then be split between who receives it in society, 
namely consumers, producers and the government. Consumers might receive it in the form 
of higher prices or better air quality; producers in the form of higher profit and the 
government as fiscal transfers (from dividends/profits and/or asset sales). Weightings on 
each of these groups can be altered as thought desirable: one might for instance weight 
government net welfare receipts at 1, consumers at slightly less than 1 (because electricity 
consumers are slightly richer than the population as a whole) and private producers at 
significantly less than 1 (especially if they are foreign). 
 
The crucial part of the analysis is to compare the actual and predicted future performance 
of the reformed industry with an appropriate counterfactual prediction of what might have 
happened in the absence of reform. The counterfactual might for instance be based on price 
and cost trends prior to reform. A reform which delivers a sharp fall in cost against a small 
annual trend fall in costs prior to reform might be expected to be NPV positive, as long as 
the costs of reform itself were small or its effects on non-monetary variables (such as air 
emissions) were non negative. 
 
The basic formula for measuring the change in welfare as a result of a reform is a variant of 
the one used by Jones et al. (1990): 
 
W = Vwithref - Vwithoutref  
 
W= social welfare 
Vwithref = social value with reform 
 





Vwithoutref = social value without reform 
 
Reform socially worthwhile if W>0. 
 
When a reform is based on the performance of companies, the key source of social value 
change is a reduction in underlying costs. This can be computed as the difference between 
costs with and without reform, less the actual reform restructuring costs (which might take 
the form of redundancy payments or consultancy fees): 
 
W = Cwithoutref – Cwithref – RC 
 
Cwithoutref = costs without reform 
Cwithref = costs with reform  
RC = restructuring costs 
 
Total welfare change is then allocated between different groups (customers, producers and 
government). 
 
W = Cust + Prod + Gov 
 
Cust = customer welfare 
Prod = producer welfare 
Gov = government welfare 
 
As an example of a social cost benefit analysis of an electricity reform which involved the 
creation of a wholesale market, Newbery and Pollitt (1997) examined the restructuring and 
privatization of the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB). This was the monopoly 
generation and transmission company in England and Wales up until 31 March 1990. It was 
then restructured into competing generation companies and a transmission company. 
Power was sold by the generating companies in a wholesale power pool (from 1 April 1990). 
These companies were (mostly) subsequently privatized from December 1990. 
 
The key data at the heart of the SCBA of this reform was to construct the turnover 
(revenue), cost and profit of the CEGB and its successor companies through the reform. This 
involved adding up the successor companies turnover, costs and profits to ‘recreate the 
CEGB’ and measuring what had happened to aggregate output (measured in TWh) over this 
period (because all the financial values need to be indexed to the output level). The same 
can be done for a typical Chinese province. Table 2 shows the information required to 
calculate the costs with reform over the period from 2012 (shaded cells are the data to be 
collected). 
 





Based on Table 1, Newbery and Pollitt, 97, p.282. 
 
Now the actual evolution of costs needs to be compared against a counterfactual of what 
costs might have been in the absence of reform. An example of this is shown in Figure 1, 
where we focus on real controllable unit costs (i.e. we further adjust for inflation). Here we 
base this on some illustrative data. By controllable costs we have excluded all costs which 
are not under the control of the companies, such as those driven by the price of fuel or 
government property taxes on companies. Here reform occurs in 2015 and we can see costs 
fall sharply. Now this actual performance can be compared to a counterfactual which shows 
that costs fell by, say 2%, 4% or 6%, p.a.  
 
Figure 1: Actual vs counterfactual controllable costs for a Chinese province (illustrative) 
 
Based on Figure 2, Domah and Pollitt, 2001, p.121. 
 
Newbery and Pollitt (1997) distinguish between a couple of basic counterfactuals (which 
they label as pro-privatisation and pro-CEGB), one of which is more favourable to the 
reform showing a positive impact (‘pro-privatisation’ in this case), one of which assumes the 
CEGB would have performed relatively well if it had continued (‘pro-CEGB’). These 
Pre-reform Pre-reform Pre-reform Reform Post-reform Post-reform Post-reform Post-reform























2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
"Actual" Counterfactual 0% p.a.
Counterfactual 2% p.a. Counterfactual 4% p.a.
Counterfactual 6% p.a.
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assumptions included costs about future fuel price and investment effects (see Newbery 
and Pollitt, 1997, p.287), some of which were reported individually in the final results (such 
as the value of cancelling the UK’s next nuclear power plant at the time). 
 
We illustrate the overall net present value benefits in Table 3 below. The pure cost effect (as 
per Table 2 and Figure 1) refers to the cost savings. This was the biggest effect in Newbery 
and Pollitt (1997). Other effects can be significant, such as the fuel cost saving effect of 
switching from more expensive coal to other fuels, lower environmental externalities and 
actual restructuring costs (R+P costs). We label two potential counterfactuals as pro-reform 
and pro-no reform. 
 
Table 3 shows these for the two counterfactual scenarios and two discount rates (one closer 
to a social discount rate – 6%, the other closer to a private sector discount rate – 10%). 
Shaded cells are where the numbers need to be calculated. 
 




Based on Table IV, Newbery and Pollitt, 97, p.291. 
 
 
Table 4, then splits the overall gains from Table 3 between government, consumers and 
producers for our two counterfactual scenarios. Here we have to make assumptions about 
future consumer prices (in addition to assumptions about cost convergence which are in the 
overall analysis in Table 3). As the reader can see the analysis could assume faster or slower 
price convergence. In the Chinese case, prices have fallen substantially as a result of the 
2015 reform (as we show in section 5) and we need to make an assumption about how fast 
the prices would have converged to their modelled level in the absence of reform. The table 
shows whether the overall social welfare is positive if non-equal social weights are used. In 
Newbery and Pollitt (1997) substantial benefits went to the companies (producers). If 
producer benefits are weighted less than one this can drive a positive benefit in Table 3 to a 
Net Benefits of Reform
Discounted to 2012 Counterfactual Scenario:
CNY Billions Pro-reform Pro-no reform
Discount Rate 6% 10% 6% 10%
1 Fuel savings excl. externalities
Externality savings
2 SO2 @ CNY per tonne
3 CO2 @ CNY per tonne




7 excluding externalities 1+5+6
8 including externalities 1+5+6+4
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negative overall effect on social welfare. Shaded cells are for the numbers that need to be 
calculated. 
 




Based on Table V, Newbery and Pollitt, 97, p.295. 
 
Domah and Pollitt (2001, p.130) compared four separate reforms in the UK electricity 
system, showing that while the overall NPV gains were generally positive, there were 
significant differences in who received them. The nature of the reforms were different to 
the CEGB and to each other. The Northern Ireland Electricity (NIE) reform involved the 
break-up and privatization of an integrated monopoly over generation, transmission, 
distribution and retailing, with the creation of separate generation, and network/retail 
companies. The Scottish Electricity Supply Industry (SESI) reform saw two integrated 
generation, transmission, distribution and retailing monopolies remain largely intact 
following privatization. This seems to lead a costly reform, with little positive overall impact. 
The regional electricity companies (RECs) reform in England and Wales saw regional 
distribution and retailing companies privatized intact, but subjected to strict incentive 
regulation and with retailing gradually opened up to competition. 
 
Lessons for China 
The UK’s electricity system in 1990 was very similar to a typical Chinese province at the start 
of 2015 in terms of its reliance on coal fired generation, state ownership and lack of market 
arrangements (see Pollitt, 2020). Since then its electricity system has been transformed by 
waves of electricity market reform, making it an important global laboratory for the study of 
power sector reform. Social cost benefit analysis of reform is a powerful tool for showing 
the overall effects of reform. It only requires data from the reformed power market being 
examined. Thus each Chinese province can undertake a separate social cost benefit analysis 
of the impact of its reform so far.  
 
Distribution of Net Benefits of Reform Counterfactual Scenario:
Discounted to 2012 Social Weights Pro-reform Pro-no reform
CNY Billions 6% 10% 6% 10%
Total net benefits excl. externalities
Case 1 prices converge by 2025
Consumers 0.975
Government via tax revenue 1
Companies 0.5
Social Welfare
Case 1 prices converge by 2030
Consumers 0.975




Note that these analyses only require a small number of years of post-reform actual data 
and some reasonable projection on what would happen into in the future (such as no 
further gains will be achieved, or convergence back to the counterfactual within 5, 10 or 15 
years). 
 
The data requirements are a reasonable estimate of revenue, cost and profits at the 
provincial level from electricity sales. In addition data on estimated electricity taxes and CO2 
and SO2 emissions are needed to estimate the impact on the government and on 
externalities. 
 
In China’s case electricity demand is growing rapidly and unit prices would likely fall any way 
under a counterfactual, as system fixed network costs are spread over more units. This 
would be the most interesting part of the construction of the counterfactual and something 
which is discussed in Pollitt and Smith (2002) for the GB railway reform, where demand 
grew rapidly after reform leading to an expected lowering of unit costs in the 
counterfactual, where demand growth was assumed to be independent of reform. 
 
Accounting information on costs, profits and revenue may be difficult to obtain at the 
provincial level. If so, revenue could be estimated from prices and unit sales. Profits could 
be estimated based on national rates of return for the grid and generation companies and 
provincial level assets. Government tax receipts can be estimated from VAT rates (and 
estimated sales) and by considering their likely profits/dividend shares from grid and 
generation companies. CO2 and SO2 emissions are available at the provincial level. There 
may be an impact of the reform on net imports of electricity, which may mean an 
externality impact related to the effects on air pollution in other provinces. 
 
Section 5: The impact of electricity reforms in Guangdong and Zhejiang 
 
Power sector reform in China has been about reducing initially high industrial electricity 
prices. While it might be difficult to get the accounting information required to do a full 
social cost benefit analysis in the way it has been done for the UK in the previous section, it 
is more straightforward to focus on the price effect and what has happened to power prices 
that final consumers have paid in individual provinces and to break down the sources of any 
price reduction. In this section we discuss how this can be done and what the results show 
for two selected provinces – Guangdong and Zhejiang - drawing on the work of Xie et al. 
(2020). 
 
Xie et al. (2020) select one benchmark price (for 35kV one part tariff customers). They 
examine the evolution of the price from January 2012 to December 2019. They also look at 
the price for regulated and market customers. Then they examine the sources of the price 
changes in terms the component parts of the price. Thus price changes might be made up of 
changes in regulated generation prices, additional charges (e.g. for renewable support 
policies), VAT, the wholesale market prices (i.e. the impact of the power market) and the 
regulated network charge (as a residual). Their analysis attempts to weight each of these 
changes appropriately (e.g. VAT changes impact the overall consumer price differently 
depending on the size of the base price) and to weight the role of market in overall price 
changes given that the share of generation in the market changes over time. Individual price 
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changes are published, albeit in multiple sources, over time. Thus focusing on price means 
that data is available. 
 
Figure 2 shows the share of total sales that are in the market in the two provinces. Note that 
only a fraction of power is traded in the market and that with the rapid growth of demand, 
the amount of non-traded power is roughly constant.  
 
Figure 2: Size the market in Guangdong and Zhejiang 
 
Source: Xie, Xu and Pollitt, 2020, p.9 
 
Figures 3 and 4 show that prices have fall spectacularly in nominal terms since 2012 in both 
of the provinces that are looked at. The real price fall, adjusting for inflation, would be even 
more impressive. 
 
Figure 3: Price per kWh for benchmark 35kV+ industrial customer in Guangdong 
 
Source: Xie, Xu and Pollitt, 2020, p.30. 
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Figure 4: Price per kWh for benchmark 35kV+ industrial customer in Zhejiang 
 
Source: Xie, Xu and Pollitt, 2020, p.33. 
 
The Xie et al. (2020) analysis then looks at why the prices have fallen by examining the 
component parts of the price fall. Figure 5 shows a big decline in the regulated prices paid 
to generators.  
 
Figure 5: Monthly regulated generation prices with VAT included for different technologies in 
Guangdong and Zhejiang 
 




Figure 6 shows that the additional charges which consumers paid within the price have also 
fallen. 
 
Figure 6: Monthly additions to base regulated retail price for 35kV+ customers in Guangdong 
and Zhejiang 
 
Source: Xie, Xu and Pollitt, 2020, p.23. 
 
 
There have been major falls in the unit price contribution of VAT shown in figures 7 and 8. 
This is because both the VAT rate and the base price on which VAT is calculated have fallen 
over the period. 
 
Figure 7: The sources of electricity VAT changes in Guangdong for 35kV+ customers per kWh 
 
Source: Xie, Xu and Pollitt, 2020, p.26. 
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Figure 8: The sources of electricity VAT changes in Zhejiang for 35kV+ customers per kWh 
 
Source: Xie, Xu and Pollitt, 2020, p.26. 
 
Finally, figure 9 shows that the power markets have delivered a positive price reduction for 
final consumers, though this is less than the other elements we have looked at so far. 
 
Figure 9: Monthly and annual wholesale market discounts per kWh in Guangdong and 
Zhejiang for generators 
 
Source: Xie, Xu and Pollitt, 2020, p.28. 
 
Figures 10 and 11 breakdown the overall price fall. They show that the network charge 
reduction (the residual) is the biggest contributor to the price fall, followed by falls in VAT, 
regulated generation price and additional charges. The power market makes a positive but 
small overall contribution. 
 
Figure 10: Sources of price changes for 35kV+ industrial customers in Guangdong 
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Source: Xie, Xu and Pollitt, 2020, p.39. 
 
Figure 11: Sources of price changes for 35kV+ industrial customers in Zhejiang 
 
Source: Xie et al., 2020, p.40 
 
Figure 12 shows percentage contributions to price reductions from generation costs, 
network costs, VAT and additional charges, for the regulated price and for the market price 
(where generation charges are additionally reduced by the market). 
 
Figure 12: The contributions to price reduction over the period 2012-2019 in Guangdong and 
Zhejiang for market, regulated and average 35kV customers 
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Source: Xie et al., 2020, p.41 
 
 
In terms of the high level objective of the PSR to reduce the industrial price of electricity. 
This has been significantly achieved with an impressive convergence towards US prices, as 
seen in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13: The monthly final average industrial price of electricity in Texas and Florida 
compared to the 35kV+ industrial customer prices in Guangdong and Zhejiang 
 
Source: Xie, Xu and Pollitt, 2020, p.44. 
 
Overall, Xie et al. (2020) find that the regulated price (relative to Jan 2012) for their 
benchmark customer falls substantially: by 26.6% in Guangdong and in 27.0% Zhejiang. The 
market price falls further (relative to Jan 2012): by 30.2% in Guangdong and 30.4% in 
Zhejiang. The weighted price (consisting of the weighted market and regulated price) falls 
27.7% in both provinces. 
 
This sort of analysis shows, very clearly, one important aspect of the reform: the extent to 
which prices have fallen. It also suggests that market reform in China is not just about the 
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direct impact of the wholesale power market but about associated changes to regulation, 
particularly of network charges (which was what was driving the benefits of the 
restructuring of the regional electricity companies in England and Wales in the previous 
section). Doing this for each reforming province would seem to be essential.  
 
Thinking about sections 4 and 5 together, it would be important to try and separate out how 
much of the price fall observed in section 5 is due to PSR related policies and how much 
would have formed part of a reasonable counterfactual. Such a counterfactual would look at 
the effect of continuing unit sales growth on unit network costs and any impacts from fuel 
price changes (or indeed changes in the generation mix) on electricity generation costs. It 
would also remove VAT changes as being due to PSR, as this is a tax policy, and should not 
be part of a social cost benefit analysis. It might also analyse the extent to which benefits for 
consumers have come at the expense of producers accepting lower rates of return.  
 
Thus, for China and its provinces the overall societal benefit of PSR and its distribution 
between customers, the government and producers remains to be assessed by a proper 
SCBA. 
 
Section 6: Observations on market monitoring from around the World 
 
A key part of measuring the impact of power sector reform is the regular monitoring of 
market performance by either the regulator or the system operator. 
 
There are some excellent examples of annual reports that do this well. These include the 
State of the Energy Market Report from Ofgem, State of the Energy Market Report from the 
Australian Energy Regulator (AER), State of the Markets Report from the US Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC), and the independent State of the Market Report for PJM (in 
two volumes for 2020: Vol.1, 84 pages and Vol.2, 672 pages). 
 
We over a few highlights of useful indicators from this reports.  
 
Ofgem (2019) has data on the profitability of generators and suppliers (profit margin by 
generator/supplier)8, price trends (price per kWh for different customer categories)9 and an 
international comparison of ancillary services costs (Germany vs UK uplift charge per 
MWh)10. These variously highlight the need to monitor the reasonableness of company 
profitability, the actual trend in prices and the benchmarking of hard to interpret prices 
against other jurisdictions. 
 
AER (2020) includes generation investment monitoring (MW entry and exit by technology)11, 
comparison of market concentration (average HHI per 5 mins)12 and the presence of pivotal 
electricity generators (percentage of time 1, 2 and 3 generators were pivotal)13. This 
 
8 Ofgem (2019, p.78). 
9 Ofgem (2019, p.63). 
10 Ofgem (2019, p.79). 
11 AER (2020, p.30). 
12 AER (2020, p.109). 
13 AER (2020, p.109). 
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highlights a particular concern in the Australian National Electricity Market (NEM) about the 
strategic closure of certain generator plants which then created capacity scarcity driving up 
prices. 
 
FERC (2020) has a price heat map (with wholesale electricity prices per MWh)14 and price 
monitoring (price per MWh per regional transmission organization (RTO) area)15. This short 
report from FERC nicely illustrates the value of visually comparing regional market 
outcomes across the US.   
Monitoring Analytics (2021a,b) is a comprehensive report on PJM which includes an annual 
market assessment of each of the markets which comprise PJM (energy, capacity, reserve 
markets, frequency regulation and financial transmission rights)16 and annual prices (per 
MWh for each market)17. This report, by the appointed independent market monitor for 
PJM, is particularly impressive because it includes an independent assessment of PJM’s 
individual markets. Individual markets are assessed as being competitive, partially 
competitive or not competitive and their market design is assessed as being effective, mixed 
or flawed. Within each market a competitive assessment is made of aggregate market 
structure, local market structure, participant behaviour and market performance. This 
independently produced report is the benchmark for market monitoring globally. 
 
Lessons for China 
Regular market reporting and assessment is limited for most Chinese markets. While 
individual power exchanges do produce useful monthly market reports, these are not 
accessible to non-market participants, which all of the reports discussed above are. It is also 
very difficult to construct a price series for individual customer types by province. Xie et al., 
2020, demonstrate what a large amount of work this is for just two provinces and one 
benchmark customer price.  
 
The State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) produced an Electricity Regulatory 
Annual Report from 2006 to 201118. It also published the Statute on Formulation and 
Publication of Electricity Regulatory Annual Report in 200719. This drew on leading reform 
countries’ experience and was deemed as a powerful regulatory policy tool (Tan et al., 
2016). However the SERC has now ceased to exist and this form of annual reporting has 
stopped. Its successor, the National Energy Administration (NEA) publishes special reports 
on different topics. One of the most significant reports is the electricity price regulatory 
report series covering 2013-201820. These reports publish detailed provincial data on 
average generation prices of different fuel sources, transmission losses, network charges, 
retail prices and additions. This serves as a starting point for measuring the price impact of 
reform. 
 
14 FERC (2020, p.6). 
15 FERC (2020, p.8). 
16 Monitoring Analytics (2021a,  p.7, 8, 9, 10). 
17 Monitoring Analytics (2021a, p.17). 
18 电力监管年度报告 http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2012-06/27/content_2171508.htm 
19 电力监管报告编制发布规定 http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2008/content_892227.htm 
20  http://zfxxgk.nea.gov.cn/index.htm. Search keywords Regulatory Report in the search box on that webpage. 
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The NEA and individual power exchanges should consider producing an annual State of the 
Market Report (building on the SERC experience). The provincial system operator should 
pay attention to the sort of reporting seen by PJM, which concentrates on the performance 
of markets related to its own system. The NEA should look at the regulatory reports and 
produce higher level commentary on overall competitiveness and final price impacts 
(drawing on the experience of Ofgem, AER and FERC).  
 
Improving the quality of market monitoring in China requires attention to both the training 
and resourcing of the regulatory agencies (which include the NEA and the National 
Development and Reform Commission, NDRC), especially relative to well-resourced 
electricity companies. A distinctive characteristic of regulatory agencies with superior 
quality reporting and transparency is that they are well resourced, with a sufficiently large 
number of employees with the appropriate qualifications (see Pollitt and Stern, 2011, for a 
discussion).  
 
A key aspect of improved reporting in China would be to highlight the negative 
consequences of anti-competitive mergers within the electricity sector. Where such 
mergers involve state owned companies (such as those directly owned by the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC)) regulatory monitoring would 
discourage mergers on narrowly fiscal grounds (to improve the government balance sheet) 
and encourage appropriate asset reorganization or market mitigation measures. 
Transparent market monitoring by regulatory agencies helps reduce internal policy conflicts 
within government where industrial policy competes (often unsuccessfully) with 
competition policy.  
 
Section 7: Concluding thoughts 
 
This paper has sought to discuss how progress with power sector reform (PSR) ought to be 
reported and measured at the individual provincial level. 
 
There are many examples of good practice in this area, from around the world, which 
provide useful templates for China to follow.  
 
We began by looking at how reform impacts have been evaluated previously. One 
important conclusion is that in market economies individual electricity market reform 
elements can be expected to have a small net effect and hence that it is important to 
measure these carefully. We, then discussed the sorts of measures by which the EU single 
electricity market – comparable to the Chinese national electricity market in scope - has 
been evaluated. Next we detailed how a social cost benefit analysis of reform can be 
conducted, drawing on case studies from the UK.  
 
We then showed how the effects of PSR on industrial electricity prices has been measured 
for Guangdong and Zhejiang. The effects of the 2015 PSR look substantial and much larger 
than the impacts in market economies, indicating that there are multiple elements to 
Chinese power sector reform, the most significant of which appears to be the reduction of 
regulated generation prices and network charges, within a largely state owned industry. 
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However, more detailed analysis is required to establish the extent to which this large price 
fall is due to the natural effect of the increasing scale of the Chinese electricity sector or the 
reduction of government revenues from the power sector. Even if the actual overall PSR 
effect in China is large, as suggested by simulation studies, it is important to separate out 
the impact of individual reform elements, such as the introduction of wholesale power 
markets.  
 
We discussed how detailed price measurements can be combined with elements of the 
social cost benefit analysis (SCBA) approach to develop better measures of actual reform 
impact. We then suggested how provincial and national level annual reporting on the state 
of electricity markets might be improved, drawing on examples of best practice from around 
the world. Proper reporting can ensure sustained benefits from PSR and appropriate 
regulatory learning from a process that is constantly evolving in the light of new 
information. 
 
China’s PSR is a massive and worthy undertaking with global consequences. It deserves 
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